Jeffrey S. Chase | Opinions/Analysis on Immigration Law

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The 4th Circuit on Jurisdiction

On June 30, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit issued a decision that might not have received the attention it deserved.  The end result of the court’s published decision in Herrera-Alcala v. Garland was to affirm an Immigration Judge’s denial of asylum based on a lack of credibility.1

But before reaching the merits, the court addressed a jurisdictional issue, and that is where our interest lies.  At his removal proceeding, the petitioner was detained at a Louisiana correctional facility, which placed him physically within the territory of the Fifth Circuit.  For some reason, the Administrative Control Court (which is where the administrative record for the case was created and maintained, and where documents were filed by the parties) having jurisdiction over that Louisiana correctional facility was in Fort Snelling, Minnesota, which is physically located within the Eighth Circuit’s jurisdiction.

However, the immigration judge who conducted the hearing remotely by video and rendered the decision was sitting at the Immigration Adjudication Center in Falls Church, Virginia, which is within the geographic jurisdiction of the Fourth Circuit.  So after the BIA dismissed the petitioner’s appeal, his counsel sought review with the Fourth Circuit.  The Department of Justice moved to change venue to the Fifth Circuit, arguing that the petitioner’s location was determinative. And an amicus brief filed by an immigrants’ rights group took the position that venue properly belonged in the Eighth Circuit, where the control court was located.

The Fourth Circuit resolved the question of jurisdiction using the language of the relevant statute.  Since 8 U.S.C. section 1252(b)(2) states that the “petition for review shall be filed with the court of appeals for the judicial circuit in which the immigration judge completed the proceedings,” the court interpreted that to mean it is the location of the judge that determines jurisdiction.  And as the judge in this case was in Virginia, it found proper jurisdiction to be with the Fourth Circuit.

The decision yields an immediate benefit, as there are presently nineteen Immigration Judges sitting in the two Immigration Adjudication Centers that are located within the Fourth Circuit’s jurisdiction (in Falls Church and Richmond, VA).  Based on the Fourth Circuit’s ruling, any of the thousands of noncitizens whose cases were heard by one of these Virginia-based judges now have the option of seeking judicial review in the Fourth Circuit.

The impact of this becomes apparent when we look at the BIA’s precedent decision in Matter of L-E-A-.2  In that case, the Board held that the respondent’s family constituted a valid particular social group for asylum purposes, but then denied asylum by finding that a nexus had not been established between that family membership and the feared persecution.  In fact, the decision created an unreasonably high standard for nexus in a commonly occurring type of asylum claim.   But the decision contains a footnote recognizing that the Fourth Circuit holds a significantly different view of nexus in such cases, adding that L-E-A- did “not arise in the Fourth Circuit.”3

Although the Board doesn’t go as far as saying so, applying Fourth Circuit case law to the facts of L-E-A-  would have resulted in a grant of asylum.  As I discussed in far greater depth in this blog post in December, the Fourth Circuit has repeatedly reversed the Board on nexus, citing the latter’s error of focusing on why the persecutor targeted the group in question, instead of asking why they targeted the asylum applicant themself.  For example, if the group in question is a family, it doesn’t matter if the persecutor is targeting that family for an unprotected reason such as money, revenge, or self-preservation.  Per the Fourth Circuit, if the asylum seeker themself wouldn’t be targeted if not for their membership in that family, then nexus has been established, regardless of the reason the family is at risk in the first place.4

In addition to its more favorable take on nexus, the Fourth Circuit is also among the handful of circuits to consider verbal death threats to constitute persecution.5  This is  important, because one who has been threatened in those circuits has thus established past persecution, causing burdens of proof regarding future fear and internal relocation to then shift to the government to rebut, and further opening the possibility for humanitarian grants of asylum even where the government meets its burden of rebuttal.6

The Fourth Circuit has also imposed on Immigration Judges a strong obligation under international law to fully develop the record in hearings involving asylum claims, particularly (but not exclusively) where the respondent is pro se, and considers an IJ’s failure to meet this obligation to be “presumptively prejudicial.”7   Any attorney who is representing on appeal an asylum applicant who appeared pro se below where the IJ had been sitting in Virginia might want to review the record to see if the duties imposed by the Fourth Circuit to develop the record, which includes a “broad and robust duty to help pro se asylum seekers articulate their particular social groups,” was satisfied.8

In spite of the above-listed benefits, advocates have identified a potential downside to the ruling in Herrera-Alcala should the Fourth Circuit’s view on jurisdiction be adopted nationwide.  To illustrate this concern, I’ll use a hypothetical example arising in a circuit such as the Fourth with a body of case law favorable to asylum applicants.  Let’s imagine that after briefing and documenting the claim in line with that circuit’s law, the presiding judge in Baltimore is out sick on the day of the merits hearing.  A deserving asylum seeker could have a likely grant of asylum upended if a judge stationed in a jurisdiction with far less favorable case law is enlisted to hear the case by video under EOIR’s “No Dark Courtrooms” policy.9  While the intent behind substituting in a remote judge might be an innocent one, the impact on the asylum seeker of unexpectedly having to overcome a much tougher standard for nexus or a narrower definition of persecution could be devastating, as the Matter of L-E-A- example illustrated.

The Fourth Circuit’s view is presently limited to the Fourth Circuit.  But should it come to be the universal rule, while whether a particular circuit will accept jurisdiction over a petition for review is beyond EOIR’s control, the agency may itself still choose which circuit’s case law its own Immigration Judges should apply in individual cases before the Immigration Courts.  EOIR would do well to look to the example of USCIS, which advises its asylum officers conducting credible fear interviews that where there is disagreement among the circuits as to the proper interpretation of a legal issue, “generally the interpretation most favorable to the applicant is used when determining whether the applicant meets the credible fear standard.”10

I mentioned above the Fourth Circuit’s recognition of the duty of Immigration Judges to ensure that the record is fully developed in asylum claims.  Scholars credit that obligation to the legal requirement on nations to implement treaties in good faith.  For example, in discussing the adjudicator’s duty to develop the record in asylum cases, two leading international refugee law scholars explain the duty to implement treaties in good faith as holding states “not simply to ensuring the benefits of the Convention are withhold from persons who are not refugees, but equally to doing whatever is within their ability to ensure recognition of genuine refugees.”11

But shouldn’t that same obligation apply to not only developing the evidence of record, but also to deciding which law to apply when, as in Herrera-Alcala, there is more than one option?  If there is an obligation on our government to do everything in its ability to ensure recognition of genuine refugees, then isn’t that obligation breached where an individual sitting in a geographic area in which the law deems her deserving of asylum is then denied protection because the judge being beamed into that courtroom is sitting in a place with less enlightened precedent?

Copyright Jeffrey S. Chase 2022.  All rights reserved.

Notes:

  1. Herrera-Alcala v. Garland, Nos. 20-1770, 20-2338, ___ F.4th ___ (4th Cir. June 30, 2022).

  2. Matter of L-E-A-, 27 I&N Dec. 40 (BIA 2017).

  3. Id at 46, n.3.

  4. Perez Vasquez v. Garland, 4 F.4th 213, 222 (4th Cir. 2021).

  5. See Sorto-Guzman v. Garland, No. 20-1762, ___ F.4th ___ (4th Cir. Aug. 3, 2022) (restating the court’s repeated holding that “the ‘threat of death’ qualifies as persecution.”); Bedoya v. Barr, 981 F.3d 240, 246 (4th Cir. 2020) (emphasizing that “under our precedent, as we have repeatedly explained, a threat of death qualifies as past persecution”).

  6. 8 C.F.R. §§1208.13(b)(1), 1208.13(b)(3)(ii), and 1208.13(b)(1)(B)(iii); see also Matter of D-I-M-, 24 I&N Dec. 448 (BIA 2008); Matter of L-S-, 25 I&N Dec. 705 (BIA 2012).

  7. Arevalo Quintero v. Garland, 998 F.3d 612, 642 (4th Cir. 2021) (italics in original).

  8. Id. at 633.

  9. March 29, 2019 Memo of EOIR Director, “No Dark Courtrooms,” OOD PM 19-11.

  10. USCIS Asylum Division Officer Training Course, Credible Fear of Persecution and Torture Determinations (Feb. 13, 2017), at 17.

  11. James C. Hathaway and Michelle Foster, The Law of Refugee Status (2d Ed.), Cambridge Univ. Press, 2014, at 119.

JEFF CHASE